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Until the mid-90s, the more active among the Brussels-listed stocks were traded in parallel
segments: \spot" (that is, with t + 3 settlement) and \forward" (with periodic settlement at
the end of a two- or three-week period). The forward market was cheaper, deeper, unhampered
by price limits, convenient also for shortsales, and played by the pros; so it looks likely to be
the more ecient tier. Yet a simple variance comparison, after correcting for settlement eects,
nds no such eect; in fact, the forward market may actually have been the more noisy one.
Going on to the issue of price discovery, which is a more formal way of testing whether the
forward market is less noisy, we extend the Margrabe-Silber price-discovery model to take into
account the asynchronism in the opening forward and spot prices. Although the presence of
the latent true morning return in our extended model precludes us from estimating explicitly
the price adjustment coecients, we can still identify the sign of the estimated dierence of
these coecients and the lower and upper bounds of its t-statistic. This information enables us
to conclude on the signicance of the test. Also, our results reject the potential price discoverer
status of the forward market: spot prices seem more informative than forward prices. This
result raises the issue of how far the nancial markets perform their central function of price
discovery and how far the conventional wisdom can be trusted (e.g. the more trading volume
the less noise the observed price contains).
JEL G14, G15
Key words: dual markets, price discovery, microstructureRelative Eciency and Price Discovery
in the Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange
Introduction
Until 1996, the Brussels Stock Exchange had two parallel trading tiers: a \spot" market with
third-day delivery where all stocks were traded and, for the most active stocks, also a parallel
\forward" tier with xed-date delivery. This paper addresses the issue as to which market
was more noisy and which acted as the price discoverer, during the period 1989 - 1996. Both
segments were order-driven, and their opening prices|the only ones for which we have a fairly
precise idea about the timing|were set via a call. So there were no rm bids and asks,
implying that the usual no-arbitrage predictions about price dierences should be weakened
into statements about expectations. The forward market was cheaper, deeper, unhampered
by price limits, convenient also for shortsales, fully computerized, and played by the pros;
so it looks likely to be the more ecient tier, with less noisy prices and doing most of the
price-discovery work.
In an exploratory test we write spot and forward prices as equal to a common true value,
plus a market-specic settlement eect (a correction for time value until payment), plus an
unpredictable noise term. We expect to nd that in the forward markets the noise has lower
variance, that is, the pricing is more ecient. Yet we nd no such thing; in fact, by some
measures the forward market may actually have been the more noisy one.
Going on to the issue of price discovery, which is a more formal way of testing the price
leadership hypothesis. From this angle, we perform the price-discovery test, market by market,
using short-run price-discovery regressions, which is an extension of the price-discovery model
of Margrabe and Silverman (1983). In our model, we take into account the asynchonicism of
the two opening prices; that is, where Margrabe and Silverman would measure the sensitivity
of the price changes with respect to yesterday's price discrepancy, we measure it with respect
to yesterday's forward premium plus the true morning return. The problem here is that the
true morning return is unobserved, implying that the reaction speed coecients of the two
markets cannot be estimated explicitly. Fortunately, we can still identify the sign and of the
estimated dierence of the speed coecients and the lower and upper bounds of its t-statistic.
Against our expectations about the forward market being more ecient, the results from ourRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 2
extended Margrabe-Silverman model reveal that, for more than half of the stocks, forward
prices tend to more inuenced by yesterday's spot price than the other way around. Even
more puzzlingly, the phenomenon is most pronounced for active stocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the markets and the data.
In Section 2 we present a standard noisy-price model and test whether forward prices appear
to be the cleaner ones. Section 3 provides the tests for a price discoverer role of one segment.
Section 4 concludes.
1 The Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange: Institutional Back-
ground
Brussels used to have not only its own stock market (the Brussel Stock Exchange (BSE), since
2001 integrated into Euronext), but even a two-tiered one: a \spot" market tier with third-day
delivery, and for the most active stocks a parallel \forward" tier with xed-date delivery. There
used to be twenty-four xed such settlement dates per year, implying that the trading periods
typically lasted about two weeks|hence their name quinzaine, two-week period.1 Details
about the market organization are crucial for our analysis. In this section, we describe the
price mechanisms in the forward and spot market and the delivery rules as they applied during
the sample period.
1.1 The price mechanism in the forward tier
The forward market used to work via a pure public limit order book (which, during the sample
period, was kept by a version of Toronto's Computer-Aided Trading System, CATS). Thus,
although brokers were allowed to trade on their own account, they did not act as market
makers, and their main role on the oor was to pass on the orders from the public to the
exchange. At 9 p.m. the one-hour pre-market started, during which orders could be added
or withdrawn and CATS displayed a continuously updated preliminary market-clearing price.
Actual trading in the forward market started at 10 a.m., with a simultaneous call market for
all stocks. That is, at 10 a.m. limit orders were matched as far as possible, and executed.
1The forward market has now disappeared, following an EU-directed \T  t + 7 days" rule implemented in
the 1990s. London used to have a two-weekly xed-delivery system too, Paris had delivery at the end of the
month in its \forward" section for big stocks. (There also was a spot section for small stocks). Basel oered the
choice between several delivery dates.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 3
Table 1: Tick Size in the Spot and Forward Market
price must be minimal percentage price change
a multiple of at lower end at top end
price range of scale of scale
BEF 1-500 1 100% 0.20%
BEF 502-1,500 2 0.40% 0.13%
BEF 1,505-5,000 5 0.33% 0.10%
BEF 5,010-10,000 10 0.20% 0.10%
BEF 10,025-50,000 25 0.25% 0.05%
BEF 50,050 50 0.10% |
Key One BEF is approximately EUR 0.025.
For most stocks the opening represented a substantial part of the day's turnover. After the
opening round, the interactive trading session or \continuous market" started (10:00-16:30).
Throughout the continuous-market session, the four best unlled limit orders on the buying
and selling side were displayed on computer screens and could be taken up by any incoming new
order. Only brokers saw the screens: at the time of the sample, individual investors just heard
(or saw) the opening and close prices over the radio or on Teletext, at noon or in the afternoon.
Orders could also be matched directly, between brokers or in-house, provided that the price
was within the book's bid-ask spread and the trade was reported immediately to the exchange.
Large trades, i.e. blocks of at least BEF 50m (EUR 1,250,000) could be crossed or traded
outside the BSE (often in London or Paris), but had also to be reported immediately. There
were no limits on consecutive forward price changes. Limit order and trade prices were rounded
according to a schedule shown in Table 1. Until the 1996 reform, the exchange's minimum
margin requirement for a forward trade was 25 percent, but the BSE left the enforcement of
this rule to the individual brokers (who bore the default risk). Securities could be posted as
margin; in fact, many investors left most or all of their stocks with a their broker|most shares
are bearer securities|and used this portfolio as margin for forward positions. Thus, there was
no opportunity cost associated with the margin.
Prices for all traded lots were shown, in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the of-
cial price list, later De Tijd and L'Echo de la Bourse. In the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 4
1.2 The Spot Price Mechanism
Due to its lower volume, the spot market was fully computerized much later (in 1996). Like
the forward tier, it was order-driven, but the implementation was fairly dierent. First, there
was no pre-market, so that the opening price was potentially much more subject to noise than
the forward opening price even apart from volume eects. Second, because of the thinness of
the market, for most stocks there was just one trading round per day. A continuous market
existed only for the more active stocks (quoted on the \corbeille" segment), and even this
continuous market was not very active.2 Third, there was no centralized public order book
kept by the exchange. Rather, a few specialist brokers each kept their own books, and met
sometime between 1 and 1.30 p.m. on the Exchange's oor to aggregate their information
and identify the price that maximizes trade from the combined order book. Fourth, for stocks
that were not traded on the parallel forward market there were overnight price limits of 5
percent (for very thinly traded stocks, traded on the parket segment) or 10 percent (for other
stocks, traded on the \corbeille" market); and, in the corbeille market, subsequent intraday
price changes could not exceed 5 percent.
The actual pricing and trading was organized by a BSE ocial, who started by crying
out a price proposal. This price proposal equaled the price that maximized trade from the
order book if that price was within the price change limits; if not, the ocial announced the
price limit itself. In addition to the price proposal, the ocial also announced the direction
of the imbalance. If there was an excess supply (demand) at the proposed price, additional
purchase (sale) orders from the oor were solicited to reduce the imbalance in the book. If the
remaining imbalance between supply and demand at the price limit was less than 50 percent,
the specialist would decide to `reduce' most or all orders on the excess side, i.e. execute only
part of each order; the transaction price was then published in the nancial press with the
qualication \sellers reduced" or \buyers reduced". If at the price limit the imbalance between
supply and demand remained huge even after soliciting orders from the oor, there was no
trade at all, and the price limit was published as an indicative price. In practice, however,
when the imbalance was only slightly larger than 50 percent the stock's specialist brokers often
added buy or sell orders for their own account to prevent no-trade (and no-commision-income)
2For stocks quoted on the corbeille, the xing was followed by the traditional (blackboard-and-chalk) version
of the continuous market: unlled orders were chalked onto the blackboard and could be picked up from the
oor, and orders could also be matched directly on the oor at a price within the book's spread.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 5
days.
As, around 1990, the spot market list contained about 300 stocks, the stock-by-stock
opening-call prices were set more or less sequentially; the exact timing of each stock's spot
xing was not registered. For the corbeille market, prices for all traded lots were shown, in
sequence (but not time-stamped), in the ocial price list but in the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available. For the parket stocks there is just the single price.
1.3 Settlement Rules
For the BSE, the other details of the actual settlement were similar for both market tiers. The
buyer payed via a bank transfer rather than by check. This means that there was no \mail
oat" on the payment side. Still, the value dates for buyer and seller did not match perfectly:
the buyer's value date is one day before the actual settlement day, and the seller obtains value
one day after settlement.
Delivery of the stock could mean actual physical delivery of the piece of paper that rep-
resents the bearer share, if the buyer desired so. Alternatively, the buyer could ask that his
or her purchase be recorded with a netting and depository institution, the Caisse Interpro-
fessionelle/Interprofessionale Kas (CIK). The CIK merely netted the physical deliveries across
brokers if actual delivery was asked, and held the paper on behalf of investors that did not
demand physical delivery. Thus, the CIK was not a clearing house in the usual sense: it did not
act as a central counterpart, nor did it cancel an individual investor's earlier purchases against
subsequent sales (or vice versa) within one settlement period. There was some informal clear-
ing by brokers, though: brokers did not exact delivery and payment for a forward transaction
that was reversed later on via the same brokerage house and within the same quinzaine.
One function of the forward market, therefore, was to reduce the cost and hassle of mutually
osetting stock deliveries and payments for trades that had been closed out within the same
quinzaine. This partly explains why, unlike in currency markets, in the forward tier the
transaction costs for small trades were somewhat lower than in the spot tier (as illustrated
in Table 2).3 A second useful feature of the forward tier is that it allows one to take short
positions until the end of the quinzaine, positions that could then be rolled over fairly easily.
3Another reason for the lower transaction costs might have been the fact that the forward market tended to
have larger volumes than the spot market for the same stock.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 6
Table 2: Transaction Costs, Spot and Forward, 1990
cost of cost of
item spot trades forward trades
BSE Commission 0.03%, max BEF 6 000y
Transaction Tax 0.17%, max BEF 10 000
Brokerage fees
- xed part BEF 200
- variable part:
order BEF 1-5m 1% .8%
order BEF 5-10m .8% .6%
order BEF 10-20m .4% .3%
order BEF 20-30m  BEF 130 000z .2%
order  BEF 30m  BEF 130 000z  BEF 120 000z
y : 40 BEF is worth approx. 1 EUR; * : plus BEF 100 for the buyer if physical delivery is asked; z : negotiable,
with the stated amounts as minima. Thus, a smallish trade of BEF 250,000 (approx. EUR 6.250) would cost
1.29 percent spot, and 1.09 percent forward. For an order of BEF 30m, the cost dierence may be as small as
10,000/30,000,000 = .033 percent.
In Belgium, there was no formal legal framework for asset borrowing and spot short-selling
until the 1991 Stock Market Reform Act, so until then the forward market provided the sole
organized opportunity for short positions. A third function of the forward market was to
provide the equivalent of buying on margin: the actual payment was deferred until the end of
the quinzaine (at which moment the forward contract could be rolled over), and the buyer just
posted the 25 percent security. Since leveraged buying was possible in the forward market, no
organized system of buying on margin was set up in the spot market.
1.4 Possible clientele and dierential information aspects
It is fair to say that the organization of the forward markets was superior: it was fully com-
puterized by the late 80s, had a pre-market, enjoyed lower costs and no price limits, and was
much deeper. In addition (or, perhaps, as a result of the above), conventional wisdom within
the nancial community held that there also was an clientele- and eciency-related form of
segmentation.4 Indeed, because of its shorting facilities and the absence of price limits, the
forward market had a somewhat more speculative reputation, to the extent that conservative
rms (such as the major banks) have long resisted a forward listing. Because of this speculative
image, the forward market was considered to be the market for the more professional agents,
while less sophisticated investors were said to prefer the spot market. Having no systematic
4We are indebted to the late Prof. Van Essche for this suggestion.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 7
and fast access to news during working hours, these amateur traders allegedly reacted more
slowly than the professionals. In the terminology of Garbade and Silber (1983), this view
hypothesizes that the forward market was the price discoverer, while the spot market was just
a (lagging) satellite market. This hypothesis is the central issue of the paper.
1.5 Taxes
A last relevant detail is income tax. For brokers or corporations, all interest received or
paid and all short-term capital gains or losses are fully taxable or deductible. So if brokers
or corporations dominate the market in the sense that they are systematically the marginal
traders, taxes are neutral. Under personal taxation rules, capital gains or losses are neither
taxable nor deductible; nor can one deduct interest costs incurred to nance short-term trades;
and interest income is de facto taxed at the withholding tax (10 percent at the time). In short,
also for private persons the gross rate is the relevant interest rate, unless the marginal traders
are buyers of stock for whom the opportunity cost is the interest foregone on a deposit.
Dividends are largely tax-exempt for corporations; for individuals, a 25-percent withholding
tax applies. Unpublished tests show that the average price drop on ex-dividend day was equal
to the dividend net of the withholding tax|20 percent before 1984, and 25 percent thereafter.
All returns are accordingly computed from dividends net of withholding taxes.
We conclude the descriptive section with some information on the data.
1.6 Data
The sample period starts early 1989, at which time the forward markets was fully computerized,
and ends in 1996; in 1997 the forward market disappeared. Euronext's historic-data CDs for
that period include the opening spot price per day, and, for the forward market, the daily
opening, high and low, and close price. Data on dividends, bonus dividends, splits, and rights
issues5 were missing, and were hand-collected from Memento der Eecten, a trade publication,
and from De Tijd, which published the Dutch-language version of the Ocial Price List. For
the risk-free rate we used the Euro-BEF 1 week middle rate from Datastream.
We discarded foreign stocks, about half of the list, since price discovery for these shares
5A subscription right is represented by a coupon designated for the purpose, and is traded separately the
moment the stock goes ex this coupon. The market values of these \scripts" are very noisy so we worked with
the standard intrinsic value of a subscription right.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 8
Table 3: Trading Frequency and One-day Return Variance across Turnover Classes
sample number of returns Average Variance Median Variance numbers of stocks
(by turnover) Spot Forward Spot Forward Spot Forward vars > varf
All 95,591 87,549 3.26 3.43 2.23 1.91 37 (out of 72)
low turnover 27,576 21,686 4.55 5.17 2.77 2.11 14 (out of 24)
medium turnover 31,169 29,197 3.23 3.12 1.92 1.66 11 (out of 24)
high turnover 36,848 36,670 1.99 2.00 1.61 1.88 12 (out of 24)
Key Each turnover class contains 24 stocks, and ranking is done on the basis of average daily turnover. Variance
is computed for the percentage daily returns |that is, in units E{4 for regular per-unit.
probably happens abroad anyway. So we started from data on 119 Belgian stocks traded on
both the spot and forward tiers of the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1996.
Some data cleaning was required: 16 stocks are excluded due to an insucient number of
observations (too many missing data points), 31 stocks are connected to other shares due to
a change in the name or code after a stock split or merger. Thus, 72 stocks remained. All
unusually large forward premia or large change in the prices were double-checked with the prices
posted on the hard copies of De Tijd, including the next-day rectications for typos. All prices
that are indicated `sellers reduced', `buyers reduced', or `indicative', were considered to be
missing observations. Whenever there is a missing price, the two returns that are associated
with that price are missing too. That is, we never use cumulated returns straddling some
missing price.
Eight years of data means over 2000 trading days. The number of eectively available
observations is very variable, ranging from below 50% to 100%. There is a clear relation with
market activity. As can be seen in Table 3, the rms in the bottom third, by turnover, on
average trade only 75 (spot) or 60 (forward) percent of the time. Forward markets more often
have missing prices than spot markets, despite their higher turnovers and the absence of price
limits; this probably reects the interventions by the spot market's specialists mentioned in
Section 1.2. There also is a strong negative relation between turnover and return variance,
prima facie, as also illustrated via Figure 2. Much of that, however, seems to be due to the
outliers: when we consider medians the schedule is much atter. In terms of numbers of stocks
whose spot variance exceeds the forward variance, the tally is almost perfectly even.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 9
Figure 1: Asynchronism of Spot vs Forward Prices
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Key t is at 10:00 am and t +  is at 13:30 p.m.
2 An Exploratory Test of Relative Informational Eciency
2.1 The Test
Let vt denote an unobservable true value based on full and correct use of all relevant available
information, expressed as a price for immediate payment and delivery. Since neither the actual
spot nor forward prices imply immediate settlement, the corresponding true \spot" and forward
values, denoted as s and f, should contain a settlement eect shown below, with n s and n f
denoting the number of calendar days to settlement and R the simple per diem interest rate. In
addition, actually observed prices are assumed to deviate from true values by a zero-mean, i.i.d.
noise term, denoted by  s or  f, respectively, which reects unanticipated orders by liquidity
traders and noise traders, as standard in microstructure models6:
st+ = (1 + n s;tRt)vt+; (1)
ft = (1 + n f;tRt)vt; (2)
St+ = st+(1 +  s;t+) = vt+(1 + n s;tRt)(1 +  s;t+); (3)
Ft = ft(1 +  f;t) = vt(1 + n f;tRt)(1 +  f;t): (4)
6We ignore the time value of half a day as interest is calculated per entire day only.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 10
where time t is 10:00 a.m., the opening of the forward market; time t +  is 13:00 p.m, the
opening time of the spot market. In an ecient but noisy market, for any  > 0 we expect
Et ( s;t+) = 0 = Et ( f;t). By postulating that both spot and forward prices are just noisy
versions of the same true value process we clearly assume perfect integration of the two markets
apart from their order books.
These models are not ready for use in itself as they contain unobservable prices. The
standard way to make such models tractable, in the sense of being able to identify some key
parameters, is to consider returns|percentage changes in S or F, as is done below. In (5)
and (7), the true values have been combined into a true return, denoted as t, which is then
assumed to be unpredictable white noise; we also introduce the shorthand notation n sR and
n fR to indicate the settlement eect in a spot or forward returns, and e to indicated ln(1+).
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 1); (5)
=: (n sR)t + t+ + es;t+   es;t+ 1; (6)
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+ ln(1 +  f;t)   ln(1 +  f;t 1); (7)
=: (n fR)t + t + ef;t   ef;t 1: (8)
This immediately induces a simple variance measure for the relative noisiness of the two seg-
ments:
var(rs;t+   n sRt) = var(t+) + 2var(es;t); (9)
var(rf;t   n fRt) = var(t) + 2var(ef;t): (10)
If true returns are serially independent, the variance of an open-to-open return (t) is the same
as the variance of a noon-to-noon return (t+). Equations (9) and (10) then unsurprisingly
say that a straightforward comparison of time-value-adjusted return variances should tell us
which market is the more noisy one.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 11

































































































































































































































































Key Daily returns are computed i there were transactions on the day and the preceding trading day, regardless
of the situation in other market segment. Variances are computed from returns corrected for time to maturity
(top) or from raw returns (bottom). The graphs on the left-hand side show the two variances; the ones on the
right show the dierence, spot minus forward.
2.2 Results
Table 3, above, already provides some results on variances across markets, but the picture
is far from clear. In terms of simple averages, the spot market seems to be relatively more
ecient while in terms of medians the picture is exactly the opposite. This holds for the all-
stock averages and the low- and high-turnover groups classes. The rightmost panel of Figure
2 displays the dierences (spot variance minus forward variance) stock by stock, with stocksRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 12





Low turnover 3.761 4.600
Medium turnover 3.050 3.234
High turnover 1.993 2.006
Key Variances of percentage daily returns|that is, in units E{4 for regular per-unit|are estimated as nobs-
weighted averages of the series-by- series estimates. The turnover-based subsamples each contain 24 stocks.
arranged by increasing turnover rate;7 among the cases with big dierences, there are more
negative ones, that is, more cases where the forward market does more poorly.
Signicance tests are hampered by the fact that a stock's sample variance in the spot market
cannot reasonably be assumed to be independent of that stock's sample variance in the forward
market. Another problem is that much of the counterintuitive results for average variances
may be due to the numbers of observations per series, which are higher for big-turnover stocks
but also for spot returns. As a straightforward correction for the number of observations, we







This is similar to rst demeaning, stock by stock, and then pooling or stacking all squared
demeaned returns, thus giving all observations equal weight, rather than assigning each stock's
estimated variance the same impact regardless of the number of observations underlying the
estimate.
Table 4 shows the results for the aggregate variances. Relative to the numbers in Table
3, all average variances are down, as expected when noisy estimates get less weight. Second,
both for the total sample and for the three size subsamples the spot market continues to have
lower variance. This remains counterintuitive, and at variance with a ranking on the basis of
medians (Table 3).
7In the sections that follow we often use graphs to display results for the 72 stocks. For that purpose, stock
are always ranked on the basis of turnover, as we did in Table 3, from low to high, and points relating to the
same variable|say, spot variance| are connected by a line. This makes them look like time series plots, but
that is not the proper interpretation.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 13
Table 5: Variances of Daily Returns, Spot v Forward; Close Prices, All Days
sample Average Variance Median Variance
Number of stocks
with vars > varf
(by turnover) Spot Forward Spot Forward
All 2.99 3.33 1.73 1.91 22 (out of 52)
low turnover 3.20 5.18 2.39 2.18 7 (out of 15)
medium turnover 4.75 2.86 3.09 1.70 10 (out of 16)
high turnover 1.40 1.95 1.36 1.72 5 (out of 21)
Key Each turnover class contains 24 stocks, and ranking is done on the basis of average daily turnover.
2.3 Robustness Tests
There are a number of issues with the rst-pass tests that need to be looked into. A rst
potential problem is that, while both prices are, formally, opening prices, the spot price is still
set after a few hours of forward trading, so it is economically speaking not an opening price in
the sense commonly employed in the market-microstructure theory. This matters because an
opening price is viewed as systematically more noisy than an intraday price. Perhaps this is
unlikely to be a major factor in the explanation of our puzzle: even the forward price is not
really an opening price, as it follows one hour of pre-trading; this gives players ample time to
see the consensus price evolve and to modify orders or look for extra information. Still, we test
the robustness by looking at the prices at the close instead of the open. Last-trade spot and
forward prices are closer together, timewise, and reverse any systematic information advantage
that might be present in spot opening prices. The cost is that this only works for the corbeille
stocks: we lose about one-third of the sample, namely, the stocks for which there was just one
daily xing.
The results, in Figure 3, are not very dierent but the spot market comes out as the less
noisy one more often. Across all stocks, the spot variance is lower in terms of mean, median,
and number of stock-by-stock comparisons (22 out of 52). While the lead is fairly strong in
itself, it is even more remarkable in light of the organizational advantages the forward market
enjoyed. Equally unexpected, the lead is particularly pronounced among the heavily traded
stocks, group 3.
We next consider potential biases due to dierent samples. In the rst-pass tests, the
variances were computed from all available one-day returns in that market segment, that is,
all days where there was a price on that day and on the preceding trading day. The no-tradeRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 14













































































































































































Key Daily returns are computed i there were transactions on the day and the preceding trading day, regardless
of the situation in other market segment. Variances are computed from returns corrected for time to maturity
(top) or from raw returns (bottom). The graphs on the left-hand side show the two variances; the ones on the
right show the dierence, spot minus forward. For about one third of the stocks the spot market had just one
daily xing; for these stocks no variance is computed and, of course, no dierence of variances is shown either.
days on spot and forward markets do not coincide, though. Days with no trade in one tier may
also be thin-trading days (with, presumably, more noisy returns) in the other section, which
would then bias the variance upward in the tier with most trading days. Figure 4 and Table
6 shows the results for time-value-corrected and raw returns, in which the spot and forward
samples are matched. The picture is again more clearly in favor of a lower variance for spot
returns. The biggest dierences still occur for the low-turnover group of stocks, even though
in that segment the forward market leads in terms of pure numbers (spot variance is smallerRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 15


































































































Key Daily returns are computed i there were transactions on the day and the preceding trading day in both
spot and forward markets. Variances are computed from returns corrected for time to maturity (left) or from
raw returns (right). The graph shows the dierence of the variances, spot minus forward.
Table 6: Variances of Daily Returns, Spot v Forward; Opening Prices, Matched
Sample
sample Average Variance Median Variance
Number of stocks
with vars > varf
(by turnover) Spot Forward Spot Forward
All 3.14 3.21 2.09 1.93 30 (out of 72)
low turnover 4.60 4.66 2.96 2.11 16 (out of 24)
medium turnover 2.88 2.90 1.44 1.67 7 (out of 24)
high turnover 1.96 2.06 1.76 1.97 7 (out of 24)
Key Each turnover class contains 24 stocks, and ranking is done on the basis of average daily turnover.
only 8 times out of 24). For the medium- and high-turnover groups, the spot market is less
volatile 17 times out of 24, meaning that in total the spot market still leads in 42 cases out
of 72. Means and medians conrm that picture. This makes sense given that the spot market
actually is the tier with fewer no-trade days: what we nd is that if we discard days where the
forward market does not trade, then the variance in the spot market for the remaining days is
relatively lower.
There are two broad conclusions from this section. First and foremost, there is little
evidence that the forward market, which seemed to hold all the good cards, leads in terms of
price discovery; in fact, what evidence there is tends to lean the other way. A second, moreRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 16
technical, fact is that the time value corrections made very little dierence.
We now have a closer look at the price-discovery issue, which is a more formal way of
examining whether the forward market is less noisy. First of all, looking at the eciency
issue from this angle allows us to obtain a formal test and its t-statistics for the dierence
of noise variances. Secondly, we can relax the assumption of no autocorrelation in the true
returns when comparing the variances, which is in line with the signicant autocorrelation of
the forward premium we found in the data. Thirdly, we show theoretically that the dierence
of the noise variances is proportional to the dierence of the price adjustment coecients in
the price-discovery regression. Last but not least, this approach enables us to understand the
mechanism of price adjustment. As price-discovery tests use regressions involving both spot
and forward returns, the sample used in the rest of the paper is the `matched' one as used in
the third variant of the exploratory tests.
3 Price-Discovery Test
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Figure 5: Spot and Forward prices
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We say that the two market tiers are well integrated if, for any positive forecasting horizon
, the expectations about simultaneous spot and forward prices are identical:
Et (St) = Et (F0
t): (13)
In terms of our earlier noisy-price equations, a sucient assumption is that both markets use
a common true price v and that pricing errors have zero expectation. Equation (13) is theRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 17
closest one can get to the usual Law of One Price if prices are set by a call rather than quoted
by market makers. This equation could have been utilized if St, the spot price at 10 a.m, had
been observable. In reality, our forward prices are observed at 10:00 o'clock while spot prices
are from 13:00-13:30. If markets are well integrated, then the ex post forward premium or price
discrepancy, lnF0=S, should consist of the negative of the 10:00-13:00 return plus two pricing
errors. To keep track of all this, let us introduce a more precise notation. The percentage
change of the true value, 10:00 to 10:00, is split into a morning part (10:00 to 13:00) and a
rest-of-the-day part (13:00 to 10:00 next day), denoted as t = m
t + r
t: The observed returns
and premia can now be decomposed as follows. In the forward return, the true-value price
change is split in two parts; so is the spot return; and the forward premium is now recognized





t) + e f;t   e f;t 1; (14)
rs;t+ := lnSt+=St+ 1 = (r
t + m
t+1) + e s;t+   e s;t+ 1; (15)
pt 1 := lnF0
t 1=St+ 1 = e f;t 1   (m
t + e s;t 1+): (16)
In order to develop a model to test for the price-discovery status of the forward market,
we start from a well-integrated and ecient market, as in Equation (13). This means that the
conditional expectations of the microstructure noise terms are zero, implying that the es are
not auto- or cross-correlated. Still, we do observe autocorrelation in both the returns and the
forward premia; the only explanation left, then, is that this autocorrelation is present in the
true returns, reecting uctuations in risk like GARCH eects or earnings announcements and
other events. We also allow the noise terms in the same day to be correlated: even though the
spot price is set later than the forward price, orders for both markets are likely to have been
submitted at the same time, in the morning, and few of them may have been subsequently
modied in light of the forward opening price.
The above implies the following assumptions, to which we add the earlier assumption that
the variance of the true morning-to-morning and noon-to-noon returns are the same:
(i) The noise has zero auto- and cross-correlation in the sense that cov(ef;t; Xt ) = 0 =
cov(es;t+;Xt ); only cov(es;t+; ef;t) may be nonzero.
(ii) There may be rst order autocorrelation of true returns.
(iii) The covariance of the today's true morning return and the true rest-of-the-day return
equals to the covariance of the today's true morning return and the true yesterday'sRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 18
Figure 6: Measuring Price Leadership
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return variance is implied in both markets.
In the context of asynchronous prices, the hypothesis of market integration in Equation (13)
must be modied into the statement that the expected forward premium plus the true morning
return conditional on all information available right before the markets opens is zero:
Et (lnFt   lnSt+ + m
t+1) = 0: (17)
Equation (17) is utilized for a price-discovery test in the next subsection.
3.1 The Test Equations
The integrated-market hypothesis in Equation (17) states that the expected forward premium
plus the true morning return, conditional on all information available right before the markets
open, is zero. This means that, whatever yesterday's forward premium plus the true morning
return turned out to be, on average all of it should be gone the next day.
A weaker version of the integration property would state that abnormal forward premium
plus the true morning return tend to revert towards zero, but perhaps need more than one
day to achieve this. Whether reversion is complete or not, after one day, the second question
is which market does most of the adjustment, that is, which is more of a follower instead of a
leader. If the true morning return m
t were observed, the leadership could have been identiedRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 19




t 1) =  f   f(lnF0
t 1   lnSt+ 1 + m
t ); (18)
Et (lnSt+   lnSt+ 1jSt+ 1;F0
t 1) =  s +  s(lnF0
t 1   lnSt+ 1 + m
t ): (19)
If  s > f, then S is more of a follower than a leader, and vice versa.
In the case of synchronism, where  = 0 and m
t = 0, these ECMs reduce to the price-




t 1) =  f   f(lnF0
t 1   lnSt 1); (20)
Et (lnSt   lnSt 1jSt 1;F0
t 1) =  s +  s(lnF0
t 1   lnSt 1): (21)
Their derivation is based on mean-variance optimizing agents that have access to a spot and
futures market for one asset only. Figure 6 depicts the error correction mechanism of the prices
in this synchronism context.
Returning to the ECMs in our asynchronism case, if the true morning return m
t had been
observed, the slopes in Equations (18) and (19) could have been estimated explicitly. Our
objective is to estimate the s, or at least their dierence, even when m
t is latent. Moreover,
we also want to test for the signicance of the estimated dierences. To this end, we add up
both sides of the ECMs. As a result, we get a regression of the sum of the spot and forward
returns on the initial forward-premium plus the true morning return, with a slope whose sign
equals  s  f. Thus, a positive slope in the sum-of-return regression tells us that  s > f, i.e.
the spot market is more of a follower:
Et [rf;t + rs;t+] = ( f +  s) + ( s    f)(pt 1 + m
t );
= 0 + 1(pt 1 + m
t ): (22)
For convenience, let us denote
yt = rf;t + rs;t+;
xt = (pt 1 + m
t );
which simplies Equation (22) to:
yt = 0 + 1xt + t: (23)
Since we assume the true return is rst-order autocorrelated (Assumption (ii)), so may be the






The following transformed model is homoskedastic non-autocorrelated, and thus the OLS es-
timate of the slope is ecient8.
yt   hyt 1 = 0(1   h) + 1(xt   hxt 1) + t: (25)
Notice that the autocorrelation in the true returns could introduce autocorrelation of the
second order in the error terms. However, in an unreported investigation for the magnitude of
this second order coecient, we found that this coecient is negligible: the average over the
72 stocks of the coecient's lower bound is -0.017 and of its upper bound is -0.014. So, little
eciency is lost when we correct only for the rst-order autocorrelation.
The slope estimate and its t-statistic equal:9
b 1 =















var(xt   hxt 1)  var(yt   hyt 1)   (cov(yt   hyt 1;xt   hxt 1)2; (27)
where n is the number of observations in the sum-of-return regression (22), which also equals
to the number of observations in the regression Et [rf;t + rs;t+] = 0 + 1pt 1.
In reality, the true morning return is unobserved, so the slope and tb 1 can not be estimated
explicitly. Instead of estimating those coecients directly, we will identify the sign of the slope
and the lower and upper bounds of tb 1 in the next subsection. If the critical value of t-statistic
1.96 is outside the bounds, we can conclude on the signicance of the sign of the slope 1, and
therefore on whether s is signicantly higher than f or not.
8The rst observation is omitted.
9In the classical linear regression, yt =  + xt + et, we have var(e) = var(y)  
(cov(x;y)2)
var(x) , and var() =
var(e)
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3.2 Sign of The Slope Estimate and Lower and Upper Bounds on tb 1
3.2.1 jT-statj as a Monotonically Increasing Function w.r.t. the Variance of the
True Morning Return
In preparation for identifying the sign of the estimate b 1 and the bounds of the tb 1, we rearrange
the terms (26) and (27) using Assumptions (i)-(iii). Our objective is to express ^ 1 and t^ 1 as
functions of the latent var(m
t ); in the next section we then derive bounds on this unobservable
parameter so that we obtain bounds on the slope and its t-statistic.
The mathematical details are relegated to Appendix I, where it is shown that the slope
estimate b 1 becomes:
b 1 =
(1 + h + h2)(var(e s;t+)   var(e f;t))




(1 + h + h2)(1=2(var(rs;t+)   var(rf;t)))
(1 + h2)(var(pt)   var(m
t ))
: (29)
Equation (28) implies that comparing the slopes s and f, i.e. identifying the sign of the b 1,
is equivalent to comparing the variance of the noise. Specically, if the spot market is more
noisy, i.e. var(e s;t+) > var(e f;t) and thus b 1 > 0, it becomes a follower in the price-discovery














where h = h(var(m
t )) is a function of var(m
t ) as in (A.6). According to formula (30), tb 1 is a
function of var(m
t ). It is proven in Appendix II that jtb 1j is a monotonically increasing function
with respect to var(m
t ), i.e. increasing when var(rs;t+)   var(rf;t) > 0 and decreasing when
var(rs;t+)   var(rf;t) < 0. So, depending on the bounds of the var(m
t ), which are presented
in the next subsection, the bounds for tb 1 will be identied.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 22
3.2.2 Bounds on The Variance of The True Morning Return and on the tb 1
We have eight second moments for observable returns, which, from Equations (14)-(16), can
be expressed as functions of 10 underlying latent parameters:
var(rf;t) = var(m
t + r
t +  f;t    f;t 1)
= var(m
t + r
t) + 2var( f;t) (31)
cov(rf;t;rf;t 1) = cov(r
t + m
t +  f;t    f;t 1;r
t 1 + m





t 1)   var( f;t) (32)
var(rs;t+) = var(r
t + m
t+1 +  s;t+    f;t+ 1)
= var(r
t + m
t+1) + 2var( s;t+) (33)
cov(rs;t+;rs;t+ 1) = cov(r
t + m
t+1 +  s;t+    f;t+ 1;r
t 1 + m





t )   var( s;t+) (34)
cov(rf;t;rs;t+) = cov(m
t + r
t +  f;t    f;t 1;r
t + m





t+1) + 2cov( f;t; s;t+) (35)
cov(rf;t;rs;t+ 1) = cov(m
t + r
t +  f;t    f;t 1;r
t 1 + m





t )   cov( f;t; s;t+) (36)
cov(rf;t 1;rs;t+) = cov(r
t 1 + m
t 1 +  f;t 1    f;t 2;r
t + m









Below, we then extract the implications for the seven unobserved second moments for the
morning and afternoon returns, expressed as functions of the observables:
cov(m
t ;m






var(rf;t) + cov(rf;t;rf;t 1))   (
1
2
var(rs;t+) + cov(rs;t+;rs;t+ 1)): (40)
var(m
t ) + cov(r
t;m
t ) + cov(r
t 1;m






t ) + cov(r
t 1;m
t ) + 2cov(r
t;r
t 1) = cov(rf;t;rs;t+) + 2cov(rf;t 1;rs;t+)  
  cov(pt;pt 1)   2cov(r
t;m
t 1): (42)
To nd bounds on the true morning return variance, we make two more assumptions:Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 23




(v) The variance of true morning return is not less than the variance of true afternoon return:
var(m
t )  var(r
t).
The last assumption is based on the fact that most trading happens in the morning, consistent








t )  m; (43)
where m and n are the right hand-side of Equations (41) and (42), respectively, which are
numerically calculated from the data.
Notice from the relation (43) that the population parameter m is non-negative. However,
for six (out of 72) stocks the sample estimate of m is negative. For these stocks, we can only use
the (much wider) bound that the true morning return must be less variable than the observed
daily returns, that is:
0  var(m
t )  var(rf;t); (44)
These relations allow us to identify the upper and lower bounds, denoted as L and U respec-
tively, of the tb 1. Specically, when b 1 is positive, i.e. the tb 1 is a monotonically increasing
function w.r.t. var(m
t ), the lower bound L is computed at the minimum value of the var(m
t ),
and the upper bound U is at the maximum value of var(m
t ). On the other hand, when b 1 is
negative, i.e. the function tb 1 monotonically decreases, the lower bound L is at the maximum
and upper bound U is at the minimum value of var(m
t ). The formal formulas of these bounds
on the tb 1 are presented in (A.42)-(A.48).
3.3 Results
We rst check the autocorrelation in the forward premia. In the absence of synchronicity
problems, the autocorrelation in the price discrepancies should be zero, see Equation (13); any
autocorrelation would then be evidence of a lack of integration. This test becomes invalid
when the two prices are not simultaneous and true returns are allowed to be autocorrelated:
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sample individual series estimation panel estimation
(by turnover) mean median n>0 sgnf>0 sgnf<0 ^ 1 SE(.) t-stat prob
All 0.27 0.26 71 68 0 0.29 0.011 25.33 0.0000
Low turnover 0.32 0.32 24 23 0 0.32 0.022 14.30 0.0000
Medium 0.26 0.26 23 22 0 0.27 0.016 17.08 0.0000
High 0.24 0.20 24 23 0 0.26 0.012 21.50 0.0000
Key Ex post forward premia for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. A zero  means that forward
premia are not correlated, a positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premia, meaning positive autocorre-
lation in the true morning return. We show summary statistics for all stocks and for three subsamples of stocks
arranged by daily average turnover.
Figure 7 summarizes the individual stock estimates visually, while Table 7 provides some
numerical information. The obvious feature is that autocorrelation is positive. Out of the
total 72 cases, only one estimate actually is negative, and only marginally so, while 66 cases or
91.7% of the estimates are signicantly positive. The averages and the number of signicant
rejections tend to fall the more active the stock is, but the eect is quite slight: the general
average coecient is 0.27, falling from 0.32 to 0.24 as we go from thinly to actively-traded
stocks; the medians are similar.
For aggregates obtained via panel regression we test the independence assumption by re-
gressing, for every equation, the 72 slopes on the corresponding turnovers. For the sample





















































































Key Ex post forward premia for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. This slope, 1, estimates the
scaled autocovariance of the forward premia. A zero 1 means that forward premia are not correlated, a positive
one signals positive autocorrelation in premia, meaning that the true morning return is also autocorrelated of
rst-order. We show estimated gammas and their p-values for all stocks, arranged by daily average turnover.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 25
Table 8: Preparing for Panel Estimation: Independence Tests for Slopes
regressing j on turnover regressing j on turnover
slope t-stat prob slope t-stat prob
All -1.80 -2.63 0.0104 -15.10 -5.87 0.0000
Low turnover 2.96 0.10 0.9199 -142.38 -2.07 0.0505
Medium 12.35 1.90 0.0707 -84.63 -3.07 0.0057
High -0.37 -0.40 0.6943 -2.97 -0.82 0.4207
Key 1 estimates the scaled autocovariance of forward premia. To be able to estimate the mean gamma via
panel regressions with a common slope we need to test that individual stocks' gammas are deviating randomly
from a general mean. Here we test whether there is a relation with turnover, rst in the all-stock sample and
then in the three subsamples of stocks assembled on the basis of average daily turnover.
as a whole there is, unsurprisingly, a signicant negative relation, but within turnover groups
there is no more clear link (Table 8). The aggregates are very similar to the straightforward
means of individual estimates, and are clearly dierent from zero. All this implies that the true
morning return is autocorrelated of at least rst order, which is a sign of slow dissemination
of fundamental information in at least one day. This phenomenon occurs across the entire
spectrum of trading volume.
We now turn to the price-discovery issue. Recall that if we could regress the sum of the
spot and forward return onto the beginning-of-period forward premium plus the true morning
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Key Sgnf>0 is for signicantly positive; Sgnf<0 is for signicantly negative; Insgnf>0 is insignicantly positive;
and Insgnf<0 is insignicantly negative. The crucial issue is whether 1.96 or -1.96 is within, or to the left, or
to the right of the interval [L U].Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 26
Table 9: Price Leadership Tests - Slope Estimate
Et [rf;t + rs;t+] = 0 + 1(pt 1 + m
t 1):
Signicant Insignicant Unidentied All
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
All 10 23 16 15 4 4 30 42
Low 5 1 9 6 2 1 16 8
Medium 4 12 2 5 1 0 7 17
High 1 10 5 4 1 3 7 17
Key For 72 stocks, if the true morning return were observed, sums of spot and forward returns could be regressed
on lagged forward premia plus the true morning return. 1 estimates ( s    f), where the s are the degrees to
which a spot or forward price on average reacts to yesterday's forward premium plus the true morning return. A
negative 1 means that the forward market adjusts less than the spot market. We report the summary statistics
on the (in)signicant positiveness/negativess of the estimated deltas for all 72 stocks, arranged by daily average
turnover.
return, the slope 1 provides an estimate of  s   f, the dierence of the correction speeds; see
Equation (22). The interpretation is that if  s    f is positive, the spot market is more of a
follower and the forward market more of a price discoverer, and vice versa. However, since the
true morning return is unobserved, we cannot estimate the slope 1 explicitly. Instead, we can
identify the sign of the slope 1 and the lower L and upper U bounds of the tb 1 according to
formulas (A.8) and (A.41)-(A.48). The Appendix III reports the sign of the slope and the tb 1
bounds in detail. This information can also help to conclude whether the dierence  s    f is
signicantly positive or signicantly negative depending on the relative position of the critical
value 1.96 or -1.96 to the range [L U] of the tb 1, which is illustrated in Figure 8. Specically,
when b 1 is positive, so is the tb 1: (i) if the critical value 1.96 is to the left of the range [L U],
then the slope 1 is signicantly positive; (ii) if it is to the right of the range [L U], then the
slope 1 is insignicantly positive. On the other hand, when b 1 is negative, so is tb 1: (i) if the
critical value -1.96 is to the left of the range [L U], then the slope 1 is insignicantly negative;
(ii) if it is to the right of the range [L U], then the slope 1 is signicantly negative. In both
cases of positive and negative b 1, when the critical value 1.96 lies within the range [L U], the
signicance of the slope 1 is unidentied in the context of our model.
Figure 9 reports the sign of the slopes and the bounds of the t-statistic of the price-discovery
regression, stock-by-stock. In general, out of the total 72 cases, the estimate's signicance is
identied in 64 cases (89% of all the cases|21, 23, and 20 cases in the low-, medium-, and
high-turnover groups correspondingly). Two observations stand out: (i) the slopes are negative
in more cases in the total sample|that is, the forward market is more of a follower while theRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 27
Figure 9: Sign of the Slopes and Bounds of the T-stat from the Price-Discovery
Regression, Stock by Stock



































































































Key For 72 stocks, if the true morning return were observed, sums of spot and forward returns could be regressed
on lagged forward premia plus the true morning return. 1 estimates ( s    f), where the s are the degrees to
which a spot or forward price on average reacts to yesterday's forward premium plus the true morning return.
A negative 1 means that the forward market adjusts less than the spot market. Since the true morning return
is unobserved, we can only identify the sign of the slopes and estimate the bounds of tb 1. The right hand-side
graph shows the lower and upper bounds of the t-stat of the 1 estimate. We show the results for all 72 stocks,
arranged by daily average turnover.
spot market leads|and (ii) this is especially pronounced in the more active market sections.
42 estimates out of 72 are negative, and 23 signicantly so. Notably, only in the low-turnover
group, the 1 estimates are positive in more cases: out of the 21 estimates whose signicance
is determined by the bounds, 14 cases have positive slopes against 7 negative, and 5 positive
cases are signicant against only one negative. This result implies that the forward market is
more of a leader in this market section. In the other two groups, the medium- and low-turnover
samples, the spot market leads in 17 and 14 cases, respectively, of which 12 and 10 signicantly
so. To sum up, only in the low-activity group the forward market is more of a leader; in the
two remaining market sections, in contrast, the price leadership status of the spot market is
statistically evident in the majority of the cases. Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion
from the exploratory variance comparisons: the spot market tends to be the price discoverer,
the forward seems to be the one that lags behind.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 28
4 Conclusions
Trading the same assets with dierent settlement rules in the BSE, the spot and forward
tiers were supposed to have homogeneous expectations about the next opening price if they
are integrated. Given this assumption, we could investigate the price-discovery issue in the
two market tiers in the aspect of the prices' reaction to yesterday's forward premium. Since
the opening prices of the spot and forward markets were asynchronous, the forward premium
become the negative of the true morning return plus two pricing errors. Therefore, we adjust
the ECMs: since prices should be correcting only the two lagged pricing errors, the ECMs
should ideally be measuring the prices' reaction to yesterday's forward premium plus the true
morning return. However, since the true morning return is unobserved, the correction speeds
in our price-discovery model can not be estimated explicitly. Nevertheless, the (in)signicant
positiveness/negativeness of the dierence of the correction speeds can still be identied on the
basis of the bounds of tb 1. Though the forward market looked like the prime a priori candidate
for the role of price discoverer, the empirical result show that the spot market leads in more
cases.
From a wider perspective, in light of persistent pricing anomalies even within one Exchange,
our research raises the issue of how far the nancial markets perform their central function of
price discovery and how far the conventional wisdom can be trusted (e.g. the more trading
volume the less noise the observed price contains). We can only speculate on the reasons why
the spot market did so unexpectedly well. The price limits that, in the eyes of the Exchange,
protect spot investors against unexpected thinness in the book can hardly be the cause: the
returns for days before and after the price limits were reached were purged from the sample
because there was no price. The intervention of the hoekmannen in the spot market (to reduce
imbalances in the book by adding trades for their own account) might have helped; yet such
interventions should have been more frequent in the low-liquidity sections, while we see the
superior performance of the spot prices most strongly in the high-liquidity end of the market.
The apparent preference for cash, steering sales to the spot tier and purchases to the forward
one, may explain the persistence of price discrepancies but doe not tell us why the spot section
still ends up as the more ecient market.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 29
Appendix I: Deriving the slope and its t-statistic
To rearrange terms in the formulas of the slope estimate and its t-statistic, we use the following
equations. The rst equation we have is the dierence of the variance of noise. From the





t ), we have:
var(rs;t+)   var(rf) = 2(var(e s;t+)   var(e f;t)); (A.1)
which was the basis of our exploratory tests (Section 2). For the present purpose, this equation
implies that even though the noise is unobserved, the dierence of their variances can be
calculated numerically within the assumptions in our model.
The second equation is for the variance of the regressor var(xt) = var(pt 1 + m
t ). From
the decomposition of forward premium in Equation (16), we have:
var(pt 1) = var( m
t + e f;t 1   e s;t+ 1);
= var(m
t ) + var(e f;t 1   e s;t+ 1);
) var(xt) = var(pt 1 + m
t ) = var(e f;t 1   e f;t+ 1);
= var(pt 1)   var(m
t );
= var(pt)   var(m
t ): (A.2)
Thirdly, rewrite the regressor and the regressee of the sum-of-return regression (23) as follows,








t + ef;t 1   ef;t 2 + es;t+ 1   es;t+ 2:
Using Equation (A.1), we then obtain the formulas for the covariances of x and y:
cov(xt;yt) = var(es;t+)   var(ef;t) = 1=2(var(rs;t+)   var(rf)); (A.3)
cov(xt;yt 1) =  var(es;t+) + var(ef;t) =  1=2(var(rs;t+)   var(rf)); (A.4)
cov(xt 1;yt) = cov(xt;xt 1) = 0: (A.5)
Now we plug the terms in (A.1)-(A.5) into the formulas of the autocovariance coecient h,
the slope estimate b 1, and the tb 1 in (24), (26), and (27), respectively. Notice that ut is theRelative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 30
residual and b 
0, and b 
1 are the coecient estimates of the OLS regression (23).
var(t) = var(yt   b 
0   b 







cov(t;t 1) = cov(yt   b 
0   b 
1xt;yt 1   b 
0   b 




















The slope estimate b 1 and t-statistic then become:
b 1 =
cov(yt   hyt 1;xt   hxt 1)
var(xt   hxt 1)
=




(1 + h + h2)(var(e s;t+)   var(e f;t))




(1 + h + h2)(1=2(var(rs;t+)   var(rf;t)))
(1 + h2)(var(pt)   var(m
t ))
: (A.8)
Equation (A.7) implies that comparing the slopes s and f, i.e. identifying the sign of the
b 1, is equivalent to comparing the variances of the noise terms. Specically, if the spot market
is more noisy, i.e. var(e s;t+) > var(e f;t) and thus b 1 > 0, it becomes a follower in the price-
discovery process.
The t-statistic obtained from (27) is implemented as follows:
tb 1 =




var(yt   hyt 1)  var(xt   hxt 1)   (cov(yt   hyt 1;xt   hxt 1)2;
=











(1+h+h2)2 (var(pt)   var(m
t ))   (1=2(var(rs;t+)   var(rf;t)))2
: (A.9)Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 31
Appendix II: jT-statj as A Monotonically Increasing Function
w.r.t. the Variance of the True Morning Return.
Denote:
a = var(yt); (A.10)
b = cov(yt;yt 1);
c = var(pt);
d = 1=2  (var(rs;t+)   var(rf;t));
z = var(m
t ):








b(c   z) + d2







(1+h+h2)2 (c   z)   d2
: (A.13)
Firstly, we show that h(z) is a monotonically increasing function w.r.t. z, which is equivalent




(a(c   z)   d2)2: (A.14)
Since a+b = var(yt)+cov(yt;yt 1) > 0, the rst-order derivative h0
z is positive, and therefore
h(z) function monotonically increases w.r.t. z.
Next we show that the function g(h) =
((1+h2)a 2hb)(1+h2)
(1+h+h2)2 monotonically decrease w.r.t. h.
Denote g1(h) =
(1+h2)a 2hb




(2ah   2b)(1 + h + h2)   (a(1 + h2)   2hb)(2h + 1)
(1 + h + h2)2 ; (A.15)
=
(h2   1)(2b + a)
(1 + h + h2)2 : (A.16)
Since h2   1 = (cov(t;t 1)
var(t) )2   1 < 0 and 2b + a = 2cov(yt;yt 1) + var(yt) is positive for all of
the 72 stocks, the derivative g0
1(h) is negative.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 32




2h(1 + h + h2)   (1 + h2)(2h + 1)
(1 + h + h2)2 ; (A.17)
=
h2   1
(1 + h + h2)2: (A.18)
Also because h2   1 < 0, the derivative g0
2(h) is negative.
The derivative of g(h) = g1(h)  g2(h) is:
g0(h) = g0
1(h)  g2(h) + g1(h)  g0
2(h): (A.19)
Since g1(h) and g2(h) are positive, we have that the derivative of the function g(h) is
negative. Taking derivative of g(h(z)) w.r.t. z, we have:
g0
z = g0(h)  h0(z); (A.20)
(A.21)
Since g0(h) < 0 and h0(z) > 0, we have g0
z < 0. Therefore we have that the function f(z) =
((1+h2)a 2hb)(1+h2)
(1+h+h2)2  (c   z) = g(h(z))  (c   z) has the negative rst-order derivative w.r.t. z.






f(z)   d2: (A.22)
(A.23)








f(z)   d2)3  f0(z): (A.24)
(A.25)
Since f0(z) is negative, as shown above, we have that the t-stat0
b 1
is positive when d > 0 and
thus tb 1 monotonically increase w.r.t. z, and negative when d < 0 and thus tb 1 monotonically
decrease w.r.t. z.
Appendix III: Bounds on the Variance of the True Morning
Return and the tb 1
Applying the Assumptions (i) - (v) and using the decomposition of spot and forward returns
and premium specied in (14) - (16), we have the following four equations, which are used to
identify the bounds for the variance of the true morning return var(m
t ):Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 33
cov(m
t ;m






var(rf;t) + cov(rf;t;rf;t 1))   (
1
2
var(rs;t+) + cov(rs;t+;rs;t+ 1)): (A.27)
var(m
t ) + cov(r
t;m
t ) + cov(r
t 1;m






t ) + cov(r
t 1;m
t ) + 2cov(r
t;r
t 1) = cov(rf;t;rs;t+) + 2cov(rf;t 1;rs;t+)  
  cov(pt;pt 1)   2cov(r
t;m
t 1): (A.29)
Now we use the above equations to identify the bounds of var(m
t ). For convenience, denote
the right-hand-side of Equations (A.28) and (A.29) as m and n, respectively. The parameters
m and n are numerically calculated from the data according to the following formulas:
m = cov(rf;t;rs;t+ 1)   cov(rf;t 1;rs;t+) + (
1
2




var(rs;t+) + cov(rs;t+;rs;t+ 1)); (A.30)
n = cov(rf;t;rs;t+) + 2cov(rf;t 1;rs;t+)   cov(pt;pt 1)   (var(rf;t) + 2cov(rf;t;rf;t 1)) +
+(var(rs;t+) + 2cov(rs;t+;rs;t+ 1)): (A.31)
So, we can rewrite Equations (A.28) and (A.29) as:
var(m
t ) + cov(r
t;m
t ) + cov(r
t 1;m




t ) + cov(r
t 1;m
t ) + 2cov(r
t;r
t 1) = n: (A.33)
Making use of the Assumption (iii) and (iv), i.e. cov(r
t;m
t ) = cov(r
t 1;m
t )  0, and the
Assumption (v), i.e. var(r
t)  var(m
t ), we have10:
0  cov(r
t;m










Applying these inequalities for Equations (A.32) and (A.33), we obtain the following
bounds:
var(m
t )  var(m
t ) + cov(r
t;m
t ) + cov(r
t 1;m





t ) + cov(r
t 1;m
t ) + 2cov(r
t;r














t )  var(
m
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t )  m; (A.39)
Notice from the relation (A.39) that the population parameter m is non-negative. However, for
six (out of 72) stocks the sample estimate of m is negative. For these stocks, we can only use
the (much wider) bound that the true morning return must be less variable than the observed
daily returns, that is:
0  var(m
t )  var(rf;t); (A.40)
So, bounds for var(m
t ) is (A.39) in the cases of m > 0 and (A.40) in the cases of m < 0.
Now we turn to the bounds of tb 1. As shown in the previous subsection, the jtb 1j is a
monotonically increasing function with respect to var(m
t ). Therefore, the bounds for the tb 1
are:
(?) Cases of m > 0, the bounds in (A.39) are used:
when var(rs;t+)   var(rf) > 0:
Lb 1>0 = tb 1(var(m







Ub 1>0 = tb 1(var(m
t ) = m): (A.42)
when var(rs;t+)   var(rf) < 0:
Lb 1<0 = tb 1(var(m
t ) = m); (A.43)
Ub 1<0 = tb 1(var(m







(?) Cases of m < 0, the bounds in (A.40) are used:
when var(rs;t+)   var(rf) > 0:
Lb 1>0 = tb 1(var(m
t ) = 0)); (A.45)
Ub 1>0 = tb 1(var(m
t ) = var(rf;t)): (A.46)
when var(rs;t+)   var(rf) < 0:
Lb 1<0 = tb 1(var(m
t ) = var(rf;t); (A.47)
Ub 1<0 = tb 1(var(m
t ) = 0)): (A.48)Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 35
Appendix IV: Sign of the b 1 and the Bounds of the T-statistic












20 2.74E-04 1.69 1.72 294 2.42E-04 1.40 3.82 25 -3.24E-05 -1.63
82 4.76E-06 0.22 0.35 15 -2.02E-04 -2.93 -2.57 40 -5.50E-05 -4.18 -3.70
11 7.96E-05 2.92 4.86 287 -1.65E-05 -1.23 -1.22 57 -1.42E-05 -1.44 -1.31
21 -2.24E-05 -0.43 -0.41 268 -4.94E-05 -5.43 -4.71 68 -1.94E-05 -1.42 -1.40
269 3.86E-05 0.36 1.01 52 7.22E-05 2.47 2.59 35 -1.35E-05 -0.75 -0.70
24 2.44E-05 0.91 1.03 9 5.38E-05 5.51 5.73 34 -2.50E-05 -2.11 -1.96
56 -4.84E-07 -0.03 -0.03 36 1.89E-04 7.08 7.56 30 3.00E-06 0.32 0.38
8 4.00E-05 2.14 2.20 260 -5.64E-05 -5.90 -5.20 13 -2.12E-05 -3.79 -2.33
23 2.16E-04 3.86 3.91 66 4.34E-05 3.02 3.13 39 -4.24E-05 -5.83 -5.24
293 -3.54E-05 -1.51 -1.41 76 -9.68E-06 -1.72 -1.47 61 9.10E-06 0.58 0.59
7 -1.30E-04 -1.24 -1.23 290 -2.44E-05 -1.59 -1.51 67 -2.54E-05 -8.57 -4.42
32 1.03E-04 1.49 1.62 71 -5.18E-05 -3.78 -2.47 46 -1.22E-05 -3.87 -2.27
77 4.88E-05 2.65 3.23 10 -8.48E-06 -0.68 -0.57 78 2.42E-06 0.41 0.43
55 -5.78E-04 -1.48 -1.43 72 -3.50E-05 -3.37 -3.07 19 1.34E-05 1.43 2.09
70 2.52E-06 0.08 0.08 29 -2.18E-05 -2.62 -2.52 1 -1.69E-05 -3.74 -2.19
16 -3.96E-04 -2.45 -1.91 60 -2.88E-05 -3.69 -3.45 65 4.32E-05 2.80 3.75
31 1.01E-04 1.76 1.80 289 -1.26E-05 -5.08 -4.54 59 1.50E-05 1.26 1.73
73 -1.70E-05 -0.71 -0.70 5 6.14E-05 1.86 1.89 47 2.08E-05 0.73 0.78
291 2.12E-05 1.85 2.04 48 2.92E-05 1.26 1.26 43 -1.14E-05 -3.67 -2.43
51 2.64E-05 1.56 2.33 26 -3.46E-05 -0.55 -0.52 69 -4.52E-06 -1.37 -0.80
296 1.17E-05 0.46 0.47 58 -3.94E-05 -7.06 -5.54 27 -1.13E-05 -2.14 -1.79
53 3.36E-05 2.15 2.33 64 -1.65E-05 -2.19 -2.03 41 -1.47E-05 -3.44 -2.87
62 3.82E-05 1.03 1.05 37 -2.82E-05 -2.67 -2.20 63 -1.25E-05 -5.90 -4.77
292 -2.40E-05 -3.95 -3.54 17 -1.29E-04 -2.88 -2.48 42 -2.02E-05 -7.19 -4.60
Key: id* is the stock id.Relative Eciency and Price Discovery in the BSE 36
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